I believe that the US Supreme Court will extremely likely rule 6-3 or even 7-2 against Obama Communism Force-Pay or Else Care. However, here is a starting point of some views and actual rulings for some late in the Healthcare illegality debate, or those on the fence to consider.
Virginia Health Care Law Ruling by Judge Henry Hudson, December 13, 2010
Virginia Health Care Law Ruling -- Dec. 13, 2010 January 05, 2011 taping of - UnCommon Knowledge: The UnConstitutionalism of Force-pay Healthcare with John Yoo and Richard Epstein Cited case of discussion directing how the US Supreme Court would likely majority dismiss Obama’s Communistic Force-Pay or Else Healthcare NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES ET AL - 505 U.S. 144 (1992) http://supreme.justia.com/us/505/144/case.html Syllabus 145 Held: 1. The Act's monetary incentives and access incentives provisions are consistent with the Constitution's allocation of power between the Federal and State Governments, but the take title provision is not. Pp. 155-183. (a) In ascertaining whether any of the challenged provisions oversteps the boundary between federal and state power, the Court must determine whether it is authorized by the affirmative grants to Congress contained in Article 1's Commerce and Spending Clauses or whether it invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. Pp. 155-159. (b) Although regulation of the interstate market in the disposal of low level radioactive waste is well within Congress' Commerce Clause authority, cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 621-623, and Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt entirely state regulation in this area, a review of this Court's decisions, see, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 288, and the history of the Constitutional Convention, demonstrates that Congress may not commandeer the States' legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, but must exercise legislative authority directly upon individuals. Pp. 159-166. (c) Nevertheless, there are a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. As relevant here, Congress may, under its spending power, attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, so long as such conditions meet four requirements. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 206-208, and n. 3. Moreover, where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, it may, as part of a program of "cooperative federalism," offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. See, e. g., Hodel, supra, at 288, 289. Pp. 166-169. (d) This Court declines petitioners' invitation to construe the Act's provision obligating the States to dispose of their radioactive wastes as a separate mandate to regulate according to Congress' instructions. That would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers, whereas the constitutional problem is avoided by construing the Act as a whole to comprise three sets of incentives to the States. pp. 169-170. (e) The Act's monetary incentives are well within Congress' Commerce and Spending Clause authority and thus are not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. The authorization to sited States to impose surcharges is an unexceptionable exercise of Congress' power to enable ________________________________________ 146 Syllabus the States to burden interstate commerce. The Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge is no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid exercise of either Congress' commerce or taxing power. Finally, in conditioning the States' receipt of federal funds upon their achieving specified milestones, Congress has not exceeded its Spending Clause authority in any of the four respects identified by this Court in Dole, supra, at 207-208. Petitioners' objection to the form of the expenditures as nonfederal is unavailing, since the Spending Clause has never been construed to deprive Congress of the power to collect money in a segregated trust fund and spend it for a particular purpose, and since the States' ability largely to control whether they will pay into the escrow account or receive a share was expressly provided by Congress as a method of encouraging them to regulate according to the federal plan. pp. 171-173. (f) The Act's access incentives constitute a conditional exercise of Congress' commerce power along the lines of that approved in Hodel, supra, at 288, and thus do not intrude on the States' Tenth Amendment sovereignty. These incentives present nonsited States with the choice either of regulating waste disposal according to federal standards or having their waste-producing residents denied access to disposal sites. They are not compelled to regulate, expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, and they may continue to regulate waste in their own way if they do not accede to federal direction. Pp. 173-174. (g) Because the Act's take title provision offers the States a "choice" between the two unconstitutionally coercive alternatives either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to Congress' instructions-the provision lies outside Congress' enumerated powers and is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. On the one hand, either forcing the transfer of waste from generators to the States or requiring the States to become liable for the generators' damages would "commandeer" States into the service of federal regulatory purposes. On the other hand, requiring the States to regulate pursuant to Congress' direction would present a simple unconstitutional command to implement legislation enacted by Congress. Thus, the States' "choice" is no choice at all. Pp. 174-177. (h) The United States' alternative arguments purporting to find limited circumstances in which congressional compulsion of state regulation is constitutionally permissible-that such compulsion is justified where the federal interest is sufficiently important; that the Constitution does, in some circumstances, permit federal directives to state governments; and that the Constitution endows Congress with the power ________________________________________ 147 to arbitrate disputes between States in interstate commerce-are rejected. Pp. 177-180. (i) Also rejected is the sited state respondents' argument that the Act cannot be ruled an unconstitutional infringement of New York sovereignty because officials of that State lent their support, and consented, to the Act's passage. A departure from the Constitution's plan for the intergovernmental allocation of authority cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials, since the Constitution protects state sovereignty for the benefit of individuals, not States or their governments, and since the officials' interests may not coincide with the Constitution's allocation. Nor does New York's prior support estop it from asserting the Act's unconstitutionality. Pp. 180-183. (j) Even assuming that the Guarantee Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute, petitioners have not made out a claim that the Act's money incentives and access incentives provisions are inconsistent with that Clause. Neither the threat of loss of federal funds nor the possibility that the State's waste producers may find themselves excluded from other States' disposal sites can reasonably be said to deny New York a republican form of government. pp. 183-186. 2. The take title provision is severable from the rest of the Act, since severance will not prevent the operation of the rest of the Act or defeat its purpose of encouraging the States to attain local or regional self sufficiency in low level radioactive waste disposal; since the Act still includes two incentives to encourage States along this road; since a State whose waste generators are unable to gain access to out-of state disposal sites may encounter considerable internal pressure to provide for disposal, even without the prospect of taking title; and since any burden caused by New York's failure to secure a site will not be borne by other States' residents because the sited regional compacts need not accept New York's waste after the final transition period. Pp. 186-187. January 31, 2011 Florida Federal Ruling by Roger Vinson Health Care Ruling by Judge Vinson Andrew Napolitano: Healthcare “Insurance” is not a Constitutional Right
Rand Paul @ CPAC February 2011, essentially states that the "Healthcare Law" that was passed is essentially oblivious to the Constitution, which when brought up to then Speaker Nancy Pelosi, she gave a look like she was a eye-glazed deer hypnotically looking into the headlights of an oncoming car.
Virginia Health Care Law Ruling by Judge Henry Hudson, December 13, 2010
Virginia Health Care Law Ruling -- Dec. 13, 2010 January 05, 2011 taping of - UnCommon Knowledge: The UnConstitutionalism of Force-pay Healthcare with John Yoo and Richard Epstein Cited case of discussion directing how the US Supreme Court would likely majority dismiss Obama’s Communistic Force-Pay or Else Healthcare NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES ET AL - 505 U.S. 144 (1992) http://supreme.justia.com/us/505/144/case.html Syllabus 145 Held: 1. The Act's monetary incentives and access incentives provisions are consistent with the Constitution's allocation of power between the Federal and State Governments, but the take title provision is not. Pp. 155-183. (a) In ascertaining whether any of the challenged provisions oversteps the boundary between federal and state power, the Court must determine whether it is authorized by the affirmative grants to Congress contained in Article 1's Commerce and Spending Clauses or whether it invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. Pp. 155-159. (b) Although regulation of the interstate market in the disposal of low level radioactive waste is well within Congress' Commerce Clause authority, cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 621-623, and Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt entirely state regulation in this area, a review of this Court's decisions, see, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 288, and the history of the Constitutional Convention, demonstrates that Congress may not commandeer the States' legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, but must exercise legislative authority directly upon individuals. Pp. 159-166. (c) Nevertheless, there are a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. As relevant here, Congress may, under its spending power, attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, so long as such conditions meet four requirements. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 206-208, and n. 3. Moreover, where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, it may, as part of a program of "cooperative federalism," offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. See, e. g., Hodel, supra, at 288, 289. Pp. 166-169. (d) This Court declines petitioners' invitation to construe the Act's provision obligating the States to dispose of their radioactive wastes as a separate mandate to regulate according to Congress' instructions. That would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers, whereas the constitutional problem is avoided by construing the Act as a whole to comprise three sets of incentives to the States. pp. 169-170. (e) The Act's monetary incentives are well within Congress' Commerce and Spending Clause authority and thus are not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. The authorization to sited States to impose surcharges is an unexceptionable exercise of Congress' power to enable ________________________________________ 146 Syllabus the States to burden interstate commerce. The Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge is no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid exercise of either Congress' commerce or taxing power. Finally, in conditioning the States' receipt of federal funds upon their achieving specified milestones, Congress has not exceeded its Spending Clause authority in any of the four respects identified by this Court in Dole, supra, at 207-208. Petitioners' objection to the form of the expenditures as nonfederal is unavailing, since the Spending Clause has never been construed to deprive Congress of the power to collect money in a segregated trust fund and spend it for a particular purpose, and since the States' ability largely to control whether they will pay into the escrow account or receive a share was expressly provided by Congress as a method of encouraging them to regulate according to the federal plan. pp. 171-173. (f) The Act's access incentives constitute a conditional exercise of Congress' commerce power along the lines of that approved in Hodel, supra, at 288, and thus do not intrude on the States' Tenth Amendment sovereignty. These incentives present nonsited States with the choice either of regulating waste disposal according to federal standards or having their waste-producing residents denied access to disposal sites. They are not compelled to regulate, expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, and they may continue to regulate waste in their own way if they do not accede to federal direction. Pp. 173-174. (g) Because the Act's take title provision offers the States a "choice" between the two unconstitutionally coercive alternatives either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to Congress' instructions-the provision lies outside Congress' enumerated powers and is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. On the one hand, either forcing the transfer of waste from generators to the States or requiring the States to become liable for the generators' damages would "commandeer" States into the service of federal regulatory purposes. On the other hand, requiring the States to regulate pursuant to Congress' direction would present a simple unconstitutional command to implement legislation enacted by Congress. Thus, the States' "choice" is no choice at all. Pp. 174-177. (h) The United States' alternative arguments purporting to find limited circumstances in which congressional compulsion of state regulation is constitutionally permissible-that such compulsion is justified where the federal interest is sufficiently important; that the Constitution does, in some circumstances, permit federal directives to state governments; and that the Constitution endows Congress with the power ________________________________________ 147 to arbitrate disputes between States in interstate commerce-are rejected. Pp. 177-180. (i) Also rejected is the sited state respondents' argument that the Act cannot be ruled an unconstitutional infringement of New York sovereignty because officials of that State lent their support, and consented, to the Act's passage. A departure from the Constitution's plan for the intergovernmental allocation of authority cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials, since the Constitution protects state sovereignty for the benefit of individuals, not States or their governments, and since the officials' interests may not coincide with the Constitution's allocation. Nor does New York's prior support estop it from asserting the Act's unconstitutionality. Pp. 180-183. (j) Even assuming that the Guarantee Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute, petitioners have not made out a claim that the Act's money incentives and access incentives provisions are inconsistent with that Clause. Neither the threat of loss of federal funds nor the possibility that the State's waste producers may find themselves excluded from other States' disposal sites can reasonably be said to deny New York a republican form of government. pp. 183-186. 2. The take title provision is severable from the rest of the Act, since severance will not prevent the operation of the rest of the Act or defeat its purpose of encouraging the States to attain local or regional self sufficiency in low level radioactive waste disposal; since the Act still includes two incentives to encourage States along this road; since a State whose waste generators are unable to gain access to out-of state disposal sites may encounter considerable internal pressure to provide for disposal, even without the prospect of taking title; and since any burden caused by New York's failure to secure a site will not be borne by other States' residents because the sited regional compacts need not accept New York's waste after the final transition period. Pp. 186-187. January 31, 2011 Florida Federal Ruling by Roger Vinson Health Care Ruling by Judge Vinson Andrew Napolitano: Healthcare “Insurance” is not a Constitutional Right
Rand Paul @ CPAC February 2011, essentially states that the "Healthcare Law" that was passed is essentially oblivious to the Constitution, which when brought up to then Speaker Nancy Pelosi, she gave a look like she was a eye-glazed deer hypnotically looking into the headlights of an oncoming car.
[[[[[Update – August 7, 2012: I was wrong on my assessment that the Supreme Court would majority follow the U.S. Constitution more literally. I apologize for wrongly assuming we had patriots other that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy. Again, I regret having so much faith in at least 2 more Justices of the Court having rationality on the rule of Law and individual liberty from oppressive creeping Socialism. I apologize for this error of trust on my part.
The United
States Supreme Court allowed a pro-Obamacare advocate, Justice Elena Kagan, to
NOT recuse herself, and under political pressure to rewrite badly written
Congressional Legislation, Chief Justice Roberts alone ruled that Obama’s mafia-style
demand of a Socialist “protection cut just for you breathing while on U.S. Soil,
or else” stood as a tax. When the decisions rendered do not
mathematically add up in their claims to have voted its passage, as voting to
pass it only on legality as a mandate does not vote to pass it as a tax…that
kind of contrary legal defining of what the law is by decision of the court in
conflict with itself is subject to challenge and should be set aside.
(excerpts of my June 30, 2012 post regarding the
claim that Obamacare passed follow below.
Go to above link for entire post with citations etc.)
On June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court rendered its
decision regarding the forcing of every American Citizen to either:
1) forcibly buy Health
Insurance or pay a penalty not less than $695 for those making $27,800 annually
and below or 2.5 % of one’s annual income (whichever is greater) – or
2) go on Medicaid or
some other Government subsidized Healthcare if your income is 133% or less that
of the poverty level.
You are given no other options…or so we are told. But considering that there are really 3
classes of Justice dissents involved, I have to ask…why should we accept that
the 5 to 4 really passed when the vote was actually 4-4 (1)?....
Question: Did the Healthcare Law regarding Part III-B
(the mandatory purchase or pay the fine requirement) legally really pass United
States Supreme Court Muster?
NO CONSENSUS as to what Constitutional
Provision acted as the engine of Healthcare was ever decided upon in
majority. Tens of thousands of attorneys
need to put down their paper, stop trusting hearsay, and read the decision
carefully and thoroughly for themselves.
The Opinion of Roberts was just that, an opinion…and oddly enough, as
regarding the Healthcare Law as only Constitutional when it is regarded as a
tax was the opinion of 1. Are we to take
that the opinion of just one Court Justice now trumps the contrary opinions of
the other 8? No. Of course we should NOT.
On its face, the Healthcare law, and any law signed by Barack Hussein
Obama II, not to mention his other legal names or aliases, under a non-judicial
activist United States Supreme Court would be subject to automatic overturn
just on the basis that he cannot meet the minimum proof requirements of being a
United States Natural Born Citizen per Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5 of the
Constitution of the United States; United States v. Schwimmer 279 U.S.
644 (1929) @ 649-650; Bute v. Illinois 333 U.S. 640 (1948) @ 653; anyone
who can successfully sue Obama based on Article III standing [1], could under
the Rule of Law have Obama forcibly resign from Office. But we are no longer under a Judicial Court,
we have 5 Judicial activists (two illegally appointed by a Usurper), with the
Supreme Court Justice now legislating and rewriting laws from the Bench as a
runaway Progressive, a rogue, a traitor to the Constitution of the United
States.
…Did the Court see to a Consensus of
Affirmation Aequam Servare Mentem (a Consensus of Affirmation keeping an
even mind)? No. A minority opinion said that it can be legal if you
rule that only this part of the Constitution over here is used, but not that
part over there; while another minority opinion said, No, you must use that
part of the Constitution over there but you cannot use this part of the
Constitution over here. Effectually, by majority, Healthcare as a
mandate, when challenged by closer examination, I would argue, appears to have
been more struck down than not, regarding the forced purchase or pay
mandate…despite claims to the contrary, even by what the Media has thus far
gleaned from the syllabus and Opinion of the Chief Justice.
Syllabus:
[Page 3] “ CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
concluded in Part III-B that the individual mandate must be construed as
imposing a tax on those who do not have health insurance, if such a
construction is reasonable.
The most straightforward reading of the individual mandate is that it commands
individuals to purchase insurance. But, for the reasons explained, the
Commerce Clause does not give Congress that power.”
On page 1 of the Opinion of Roberts,
C.J., we read that:
“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, III-C,
An opinion with respect to
Part IV, in which JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE KAGAN [whom should have recused herself or been forced into
recusal] join,
And an opinion [by
himself, alone] with respects to Parts III-A, III-B, and III-D.”
That is, in respect to Parts III – A,
III-B, and III –D, the Court voted it down 8-1. In respects to Part IV,
the vote is defeated by 6 – 3, and because Justice Ginsburg and Sotomayor join
in direct conflict of what Constitutional Provision and total conflict of what
the application of the Law is in regard to Healthcare, we must view that Parts
I,II, III-C fail also.
In the Opinion of Ginsburg, J., we
find that JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE
KAGAN “join as to Parts I, II, II, and IV” with the exception
that Justices Ginsburg (and Sotomayor) while agreeing to Parts I, II, III –C
and joining Justice Roberts opinion, Ginsburg then goes on to make a dissent as
to what Law and Provision of the Constitution by which any concurring opinion
she has would be based on. In effect, Justice Ginsburg (and Justice
Sotomayor joining her) cast a defeated vote of 2 against 7 that by the Commerce
Clause alone is Healthcare Constitutional.
…Consider this: By a Majority Vote,
whether we attribute it as 8-1, or 5-4, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the Healthcare mandate as a tax. The absolute dissenting votes were
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Alito. And yet, whether by a single vote by a Chief Justice or
a minority vote not enough for passage, we are supposed to call the Healthcare
Mandate Law as long as we call it a Tax? Chief Justice Roberts cited
Article 1, Section 1, Clause 8 of the Constitution, of the right of Congress to
“lay and collect taxes”; the majority of the Court’s 9 Justices of the
Court REJECTED that analysis.
Justice Ginsburg in her opinion very
clearly and specifically specified that she did NOT vote for passage of Parts
I, II, III-C of the Healthcare Mandate except it be interpreted as legal by
means of the use of the Commerce Clause, not as a tax. Even if arguing for a
passage of the Healthcare Mandate, as a Dissent on the mechanics of how and why
the Healthcare Mandate should be legally interpreted in direct or in a
diametrical opposition to the view of John Roberts, it is still a DISSENT
against Roberts’ view, and places Roberts, again, in the minority.
… But DID Congress act intentionally
on the specificity of language so as to distinguish tax from penalty, et cetera? NO.
Then Speaker of the House, Nancy
Pelosi: “We have to pass the
[Health Care] Bill so that you
[we] can, uh, find out what’s in it”
…Questions remain as to the validity
of Healthcare mandate enforcement, and by what engine of operation (as a Tax or
as Commerce) if it does remain.
End of Update]]]]]
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