First posted at:
The
Future of the U.S. Nuclear Triad, Fiscal Austerity, and the Vision of “Nuclear
Zero”
By Michaela Bendikova
August 8, 2012
August 8, 2012
Abstract: The U.S. government’s own policies risk creating a gap
between U.S. nuclear capabilities and the future demands of the uncertain
strategic environment. As a matter of national security, the U.S. must
revitalize its nuclear-weapons complex. On June 27, 2012, The Heritage
Foundation’s Michaela Bendikova addressed an audience of nuclear experts and
future leaders at the conference of the Project on Nuclear Issues (a project of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies) at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory. She explained why the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex and strategic
delivery platforms require significant continuing investments.
Churchill once said that, “Americans
can always be counted on to do the right thing... after they have exhausted all
other possibilities.” When it comes to doing the right thing on U.S.
nuclear-weapons policy, this maxim may not hold true anymore. Fiscal and arms
control policies of the U.S. government are putting us on the path toward a world
without U.S. nuclear weapons. Never mind that the U.S. nuclear deterrent has
safeguarded our, and allied, security for decades.
Today, we are at risk of creating a
gap between U.S. nuclear capabilities and the future demands of the uncertain
strategic environment. We must revitalize the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex. We
simply don’t know what the future holds.
Let’s look at the current situation:
Most members of this audience are younger than our strategic systems. In about
2030, we will have 60-year-old intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
40-year-old submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
35-to-70-year-old strategic bombers—a truly aging U.S. nuclear triad. At this
point in time, there are no certain nuclear modernization plans.
These are just the delivery systems.
The United States has not explosively tested its nuclear weapons since 1992.
This country has underfunded its nuclear-weapons complex for years.
Our nuclear warheads were designed
for safety and yield-to-weight ratio. They were not designed for long service
lives in an environment in which nuclear testing is precluded. In a few years,
for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, the new generation of
U.S. nuclear-weapons experts will have no nuclear-testing experience. Few of
them will have participated in the design of a new nuclear weapon. Yet, these
people will be relied upon to make judgments about changes to U.S. nuclear
weapons. In the words of former Defense Secretary Robert Gates: “To be blunt,
there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the
number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our
stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.”
The country now operates under
spending caps established under the Budget Control Act of 2011. These will
result in an approximately $483 billion cut to the defense portion of the
budget over the next nine years (the amount varies depending on which baseline
is used). Unless the law is changed, another process called sequestration will
result in about a half-trillion-dollar additional reduction of the defense
budget. Secretary of Defense Panetta described these cuts as “devastating.”
Here is what could happen to U.S. strategic systems: The new strategic bomber
could be terminated; the next generation of ballistic missile submarines could
be delayed and the current fleet reduced to ten boats; and the ICBM leg of the
U.S. nuclear triad could be eliminated.
Unrelated to the Budget Control Act,
other critical nuclear complex modernization projects have been delayed in the
President’s FY 2013 budget request. This happened despite the President’s own
certification to the Senate during the debate on the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (New START). He promised to accelerate the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research and Replacement facility. He promised to request full funding for this
project. Yet, for FY 2013, the Administration proposed to defer the
construction of this facility for at least five years. It has cut the funding
by 83 percent (compared to the FY 2012 enacted level).
The Administration also agreed to a
nuclear-complex modernization plan in the updated 1251 Section of the 2010
National Defense Authorization Act. Its promises did not survive the first year
of New START’s entry into force. The nuclear-weapons modernization requirements
in the New START resolution of ratification were completely ignored. While the
Administration pledged $7.9 billion for nuclear infrastructure modernization in
FY 2013, the President’s current budget request misses this mark by $0.3
billion.
Decisions that the United States
makes today will influence its strategic posture and modernization plans for
years to come. According to the President’s Nuclear Posture Review, “preventing
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism” and “reducing the role of U.S.
nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy” are the two key objectives
of U.S. policy and posture. Deterring nuclear war is third on the list of
priorities.
Yet, there is no demonstrated link
between the number of U.S. nuclear weapons and non-proliferation. U.S. policies
are not the most important factor when a state decides on its nuclear program.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced its total
stockpile by 75 percent. Yet new actors armed with nuclear weapons have
emerged.
U.S. nuclear weapons continue to
serve critical national security objectives. Among these objectives is the
deterring of an attack against the U.S. and allies. In a post-Cold War
environment, U.S. policymakers must ask Dr. Keith Payne’s favorite question
about the capability needed for effective strategic deterrence: “How much is
enough?” The Obama Administration seems to think that the lower the
number of U.S. nuclear weapons, the better off the United States will be. Relying
on minimal standards of force adequacy is risky. It requires fundamental shifts
in U.S. targeting policy from counter-force to counter-value targets, such as
cities. Counter-value targeting is an insufficient foundation for an effective
deterrence.
The tension between the desire for a
world without nuclear weapons and the need to support funding for nuclear-force
modernization is particularly striking. The U.S. nuclear-weapons complex and
strategic delivery platforms require significant investments. These investments
are essential because U.S. nuclear weapons continue to serve critical American
security interests. They deserve our support. Churchill needs to be right.
—Michaela Bendikova is Research Associate for Strategic Issues in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation. These remarks do not represent
the views of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
See also:
About
the Author
Michaela Bendikova Research Associate for
Strategic Issues
Michaela Bendikova
- Research Associate for Strategic Issues
Michaela Bendikova specializes in missile defense, nuclear weapons
modernization and arms control as research associate for strategic
issues in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies.
Bendikova has authored and co-authored research papers and
commentary for Heritage as well as contributed to the think tank’s
rapid-response policy blog, The Foundry. Her work has appeared in online venues such as FoxNews.com, The Daily Caller and Big Peace.
Bendikova holds a master of science degree in defense and
strategic studies from Missouri State University, where she was awarded
the Ulrike Schumacher Memorial Scholarship for two years. She received a
bachelor’s degree in international relations and defense and strategic
studies from Masaryk University, Czech Republic.
She is a National Security Fellow with the Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies and a former Publius Fellow at the Claremont
Institute.
She participates in the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Nuclear
Scholars Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS). During the PONI conference in June 2012 at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, she spoke on “The Future of the Triad,
Fiscal Austerity and the Vision of Nuclear Zero.”
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