Tensions and Operational Challenges in Pakistan | Stratfor
June 7, 2012 | 0900 GMT
By Scott Stewart
On June 4, four U.S. diplomats assigned to the Consulate General of
the United States in Peshawar, Pakistan, were stopped at a military
checkpoint and temporarily detained after refusing to allow their two
vehicles to be searched. The diplomats -- including a vice consul --
were traveling in a two-vehicle motorcade and were accompanied by three
Pakistani Foreign Service National (FSN) security officers.
According to media reports, the Pakistani military has charged that
the diplomats had traveled to Malakand without first obtaining
permission from the Pakistani government. Malakand is a city located
about 120 kilometers (75 miles) northeast of Peshawar in the
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier
Province. Because of the problems Pakistan has had with foreign jihadists in its border badlands,
all foreigners are required to obtain something called a No Objection
Certificate from Pakistan's Interior Ministry before visiting areas in
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the adjacent Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. Furthermore, the Pakistani press noted that the Pakistani
military also objected to the Americans and their Pakistani FSNs' being
armed and operating vehicles with fake license plates to disguise the
diplomatic vehicles.
At its core, though, this incident is not about these small
infractions. Indeed, Peshawar is the capital of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
province and diplomats stationed there already have received host
country permission to be in the province. Additionally, U.S. diplomats
assigned to Peshawar rarely venture outside of their secure compounds
without a protective detail because of the extreme security threat in
the city. Rather, this incident is a product of the strain in
U.S.-Pakistani relations.
Motorcade Operations
The threat against U.S. diplomats in Peshawar is quite acute. In
August 2008, American Consul General in Peshawar Lynne Tracy survived a
small-arms attack against her motorcade. In November 2008, the director
of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Peshawar, Stephen
Vance, was assassinated in an attack on his vehicle. In June 2009, Peshawar's Pearl Continental Hotel,
which housed many foreign diplomats and U.N. personnel, was attacked
with a massive vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), and in
April 2010 the American Consulate building was the target of an elaborate VBIED plot. In May 2011, a U.S. diplomatic motorcade
was attacked in Peshawar using a remotely detonated VBIED that was
activated as the motorcade drove past. Jihadists also have attacked
numerous Pakistani targets inside the city, including military, police
and other government officials.
Given the threat in Peshawar, it makes sense that the vice consul
would travel in an armed motorcade to attend a meeting -- especially in
Malakand, which is even more remote than Peshawar and even more
dangerous for a U.S. government employee. The use of fake vehicle tags
is also logical. There are places where it is beneficial to announce
one's diplomatic status, but in Peshawar, diplomatic vehicles and
premises are targeted specifically for attacks. It is also an
environment in which the militants possess the weaponry to engage a
fully armored vehicle, so it is much better to attempt to be low key
than to maintain a high-profile protective detail. American and other
diplomats frequently do this in Pakistan, so it was somewhat
disingenuous of the Pakistani military to raise it as a point of
contention in this case.
From the configuration of the motorcade as shown on Pakistani
television, it appears that it was intended to safeguard the vice
consul, who was presumably riding in the rear seat of the first vehicle
with a U.S. driver and the agent in charge of his protective detail
riding in the vehicle's front passenger seat. The security follow-car
appears to have been staffed by a U.S. shift leader riding in the front
passenger seat and a Pakistani FSN driver and two FSN security officers
in the rear of the vehicle.
It is not clear if the three U.S. security officers are full-time
government employees or contractors. They reportedly were carrying U.S.
diplomatic passports at the time of the incident, but not everyone who
holds a diplomatic passport is afforded full diplomatic immunity. Still,
it is likely they were at the very least members of the administrative
and technical staff and that they would be afforded functional
diplomatic immunity for activities related to their official duties.
This case is quite unlike the January 2011 Raymond Davis case,
in which a contract security officer assigned to the U.S. Consulate
General in Lahore shot and killed two men who he claims attempted to rob
him. In the June 4 incident, the security officers were with the
diplomat they were protecting and clearly were performing their assigned
duties. This means they would be immune from prosecution for any
violations the Pakistanis can cite in this incident. However, the FSN
security officers could find themselves in a much worse position if the
Pakistani government decides to pursue charges against them.
U.S.-Pakistani Tensions
While the June 4 incident is unlike the Davis case, it certainly is
related to the growing tension between the United States and Pakistan
exacerbated by the Davis shootings. The countries' relationship
deteriorated further after the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's hideout in
Pakistan. Relations between the two countries reached an all-time low in November 2011 after
U.S. airstrikes against a Pakistani military post along the country's
northwestern border with Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of 24
Pakistani soldiers. In response, the Pakistani government shut down
NATO's supply route into Afghanistan, asked U.S. forces to vacate an air
base used to fly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and suspended military
and intelligence cooperation.
After the November 2011 airstrike, the United States
noticeably scaled back its UAV strikes in Pakistan. From Jan. 1 to May
21, the United States conducted just 13 UAV strikes while it sought to
persuade the Pakistanis to reopen the NATO supply lines. However, since
the conclusion of the NATO summit May 21, there have been eight U.S.
airstrikes, including three strikes on June 2-4. The June 4 strike
reportedly resulted in the death of al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi.
Considering this dynamic, it was no coincidence that the U.S.
diplomatic motorcade was stopped the evening of June 4. The incident was
meant to send a message to the Americans -- and perhaps even more
important, a message to the Pakistani public, which has been full of anti-American sentiment
since well before the Davis case. In fact, the Pakistani government has
used anti-American sentiment as a tool for many years now, spanning
several military administrations and now a civilian administration. The
presence of a television crew at the scene also raises the possibility
that the Pakistani military staged the entire incident.
The video shot by the television crew revealed another interesting
point aside from the continuing tensions between the Americans and
Pakistanis. Based on the footage, it is apparent that even though it has
been two-and-a-half years since the suicide bombing against the CIA base
in Khost, Afghanistan, and a year and a half since the Davis case,
Washington continues to send Caucasian-looking men to work in this very
hostile region rather than recruiting officers who could blend in on the
street. The presence of Caucasians in a city like Malakand would draw
even more attention than diplomatic vehicle plates.
Following 9/11, there was a rapid increase in the number of case
officers assigned to collect information pertaining to al Qaeda and bin
Laden, and the CIA was assigned to be the lead agency in the hunt.
According to government sources, one big problem with this was that most
of the case officers hired were young, inexperienced and ill suited to
the mission. The CIA was simply unable to recruit case officers who
understood the region's culture, issues and actors and who could move
imperceptibly within the local milieu. Instead, the case officers are
obviously foreigners. Along with the threat level in places like
Pakistan and Afghanistan, this ensures that these officers, like other
U.S. government employees in the region, receive protection when they
leave secure compounds.
Not only does the United States lack officers who can blend in within
the region, but also the Americans' operational security is typically
worse than al Qaeda's. The areas where the remaining al Qaeda leadership
is hiding are remote and insular. Visitors to the area are quickly
recognized and identified -- especially if they happen to be Caucasian.
Local residents who spend too much time talking to such outsiders often
are labeled as spies and killed. These conditions have helped the
jihadists maintain a superior human intelligence (and
counterintelligence) network in the area.
The June 4 incident highlights the persistence of these
organizational problems as they continue hampering U.S. efforts to
collect intelligence in Pakistan.
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