The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)
@ 672 :“The law of nations is also called the law of nature; it is founded on the common consent, as well as the common sense, of the world.”
@ 668: “The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power. He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) @ 25
“Congress and the President, like the courts, possess
no power not derived from the Constitution.”
As President, the Constitution states in Article 2 Section 1 Clause 8 that:
"Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
In Article 4, Section 4
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) @27
“The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and, where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary, and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text; but where there is ambiguity or doubt, or where two views may well be entertained, contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction is entitled to the greatest weight. Certainly plaintiffs in error cannot reasonably assert that the clause of the Constitution under consideration so plainly sustains their position as to entitle them to object that contemporaneous history and practical construction are not to be allowed their legitimate force, and, conceding that their argument inspires a doubt sufficient to justify resort to the aids of interpretation thus afforded, we are of opinion that such doubt is thereby resolved against them, the contemporaneous
CONTEMPORANEOUS: existing, occurring, or originating during the same time period
practical exposition of the Constitution being too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 5 U. S. 309.” (1803)
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) @29
"the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). Therefore, the President cannot have "inherent" authority to declare anyone to be an "enemy combatant," without recourse to judicial review.
Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900) @ 403
Where the Constitution “asserts a certain right, or lays down a certain principle of law * * * , it speaks for the entire people.”
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) @373.
"That the Constitution contains no express provision on the subject is not in itself controlling; for with the Constitution * * * what is reasonably implied is as much a part of it as what is expressed."
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) @ 638
“[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials * * * . One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”
Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) @ 383
The language of the Constitution "has to be interpreted in the light of the tacit assumptions upon which it is reasonable to suppose that the language was used."
Ex Parte Milligan , 71 U. S. 2 (1866) @121
“…the President…is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws;
and there is "no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction."
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1925) @177 (dissent)
“…MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, dissenting.
"… The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws
or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) @ 272
"It is clear, of course, that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) @ 877
"But "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution," Almeida-Sanchez, supra at 413 U. S. 272, "
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)@ 14
"The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and, if allowed to flourish, would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government. If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes. But we have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it which are not there. "
“…the President…is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws;
and there is "no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction."
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1925) @177 (dissent)
“…MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, dissenting.
"… The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws
or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) @ 272
"It is clear, of course, that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) @ 877
"But "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution," Almeida-Sanchez, supra at 413 U. S. 272, "
Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900) @ 403
Where a constitutional provision is complete in itself, it needs no further legislation to put it in force. When it lays down certain general principles, as to enact laws upon a certain subject, or for the incorporation of cities of certain population, or for uniform laws upon the subject of taxation, it may need more specific legislation to make it operative. In other words, it is self-executing only so far as it is susceptible of execution. But where a constitution asserts a certain right, or lays down a certain principle of law or procedure, it speaks for the entire people as their supreme law, and is full authority for all that is done in pursuance of its provision. In short, if complete in itself, it executes itself.”
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) @ 638
Government of limited power need not be anemic government. Assurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and, by making us feel safe to live under it, makes for its better support. Without promise of a limiting Bill of Rights, it is
doubtful if our Constitution could have mustered enough strength to enable its ratification. To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak government over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind in preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous end.
…
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, * * * but these powers * * * are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)@ 14
"The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and, if allowed to flourish, would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government. If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes. But we have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it which are not there. "
50 U.S. Code § 21 - Restraint, regulation, and removal
"Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies.
The President is authorized in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety."
(See also 96 Cong. Rec. 14,296, 14,297 (1950) and Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) @ 163, n.4; 170-72, n.17.)
50 U.S. Code § 1631 - Declaration of national emergency by Executive order; authority; publication in Federal Register; transmittal to Congress
“When the President declares a national emergency, no powers or authorities made available by statute for use in the event of an emergency shall be exercised unless and until the President specifies the provisions of law under which he proposes that he, or other officers will act. Such specification may be made either in the declaration of a national emergency, or by one or more contemporaneous or subsequent Executive orders published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.”
50 U.S. Code § 843 - Application of Internal Security Act of 1950 to members of Communist Party and other subversive organizations; “Communist Party” defined
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully becomes or remains a member of
(2) any other organization having for one of its purposes or objectives the establishment, control, conduct, seizure, or overthrow of the Government of the United States, or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, by the use of force or violence, with knowledge of the purpose or objective of such organization shall be subject to all the provisions and penalties of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended [50 U.S.C. 781 et seq.], as a member of a “Communist-action” organization.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “Communist Party” means the organization now known as the Communist Party of the United States of America, the Communist Party of any State or subdivision thereof, and any unit or subdivision of any such organization, whether or not any change is hereafter made in the name thereof.
Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Emergency Detention Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 102, 64 Stat. 1019, repealed by Non-Detention Act, Pub. L. No. 92-128, §2(a), 85 Stat. 348 (1971) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000))
Ex Parte Mulligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) @127
"Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectively closes the courts and deposes the civil administration."
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) @85
“…facts that we are to assume are that a state of insurrection existed and that the governor, without sufficient reason, but in good faith, in the course of putting the insurrection down, held the plaintiff until he thought that he safely could release him.”
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) @400-401
“every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how unjustified by the exigency or subversive of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat”
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) @ 635-638
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances,
Page 343 U. S. 636
and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government,
Page 343 U. S. 637
as an undivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling
Page 343 U. S. 638
the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270
(1885) @ 290-292
"...the maxim that the King can
do no wrong has no place in our system of government, yet it is also true, in respect
to the state itself, that whatever wrong is attempted in its name is imputable
to its government, and not to the state, for, as it can speak and act only by
law, whatever it does say and do must be lawful. That which therefore is unlawful
because made so by the supreme law, the Constitution of the United States, is
not the word or deed of the state, but is the mere wrong and trespass of those
individual persons who falsely speak and act in its name.
"
@290 “ The government is an
agent, and, within the sphere of the agency, a perfect representative; but
outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. …the maxim that the King can do no
wrong has no place in our system of government….
That which therefore is unlawful
because made so by the supreme law, the Constitution of the United States, is
not the word or deed of the state, but is the mere wrong and trespass of those
individual persons who falsely speak and act in its name.
@ 291 Of what avail are written
constitutions, whose bills of right for the security of individual liberty have
been written too often with the blood of martyrs shed upon the battlefield and
the scaffold, if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed
with impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and
enforce them, and that too with the sacred authority of law, not only
compelling obedience, but entitled to respect?
The whole frame and scheme of the political institutions of this country, state and federal, protest against it. Their continued existence is not compatible with it. It is the doctrine of absolutism, pure, simple, and naked, and of communism, which is its twin, the double progeny of the same evil birth."
@292
The mandate of the state affords no
justification for the invasion of rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States; otherwise, that Constitution would not be the supreme law of the
land.”
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)@
@ 176 "... The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written.
@177 "… an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.
@178 "... the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature...."
@179
... it is apparent that the framers of the Constitution
@180
contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the Legislature.
...It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned,
and not the laws of the United States generally,
but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) @ 491
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,
there can be no rulemaking or legislation which would abrogate them."
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) @442
“…an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) @376 -377
“An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.
An offence created by it is not a crime.
A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void,
and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.”
Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97 (1887) @101-102
“An unconstitutional act is not a law; it binds no one, and protects no one.”
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 12 Wheat. 213 (1827) @ 322
"The single question for consideration is whether the act ...is consistent with or repugnant to the Constitution of the United States?"
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 159 - 160
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and, if it be so...it is simply an illegal act upon the part of a State official in attempting, by the use of the name of the State, to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state [official] ...seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is, in that case, stripped of his official or representative character, and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. See In re Ayers, supra, p. 123 U. S. 507.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) @ 87
“The question whether a law is void for its repugnancy to the Constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy... The Court, when impelled by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station could it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that station imposes. … The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.”
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) @ 495, 528-29
@ 495 “Extraordinary conditions, such as an economic crisis, may call for extraordinary remedies, but they cannot create or enlarge constitutional power.”
@528 “Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. [Case Footnote: See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 71 U. S. 120, 71 U. S. 121; Home Building &; Loan Assn v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 290 U. S. 426. ]
The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the
Page 295 U. S. 529
imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such assertions of extraconstitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment --
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." “
…Second. The question of the delegation of legislative power. We recently had occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of this question. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388. The Constitution provides that
"All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
Art I, § 1. And the Congress is authorized "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" its general powers. Art. I, 8, par. 18. The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. “
Remember that the legal Difference Between Tax and Penalty Means that Obamacare NEVER passed the Supreme Court Vote, it voted as 1-8 as a tax, and 4-5 a penalty, losing and is NOT legally in place and must be so declared.
U.S. v. La Franca 282 U.S. 568 (1931) @ 572
“ A tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty …is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act. The two words are not interchangeable, one for the other. No mere exercise of the art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such.
Of Treaties:
Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 Howard) 635 (1853) @ 657
"By the Constitution of the United States, the President has the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. ... And the Constitution declares that all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land. The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions unless they violate the Constitution of the United States."
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wallace) 616 (1870) @ 620
"The second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States declares that
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."
It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) @ 267
"The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the states.
It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government, or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent." [Case citations omitted]
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) @ 701
". as will appear by tracing the history of the statutes, treaties and decisions upon that subject -- always bearing in mind that statutes enacted by Congress, as well as treaties made by the President and Senate, must yield to the paramount and supreme law of the Constitution."
State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) @432-433
@ 432 "It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do.
@ 433 . Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution...."
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) @ 341
"A treaty made under the authority of the United States "shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Constitution, Art. VI, § 2.
The treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend "so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids..." [Case citations omitted]
United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926) @ 208
"The decisions of this Court generally have regarded treaties as on much the same plane as acts of Congress, and as usually subject to the general limitations in the Constitution.."
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956)@ 17
"This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty."
Article III Standing...What did the
Supreme Court Say About It?
Supreme Court Say About It?
Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962) @204,208
@204 "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing. It is, of course, a question of federal law."
@208 " A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution when such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally, cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299; or by a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts, cf. United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, or by a stuffing of the ballot box, cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385."
" "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 163. "
United States v. SCRAP 412 U.S. 669 (1973) @686,
688
688
@686 "In interpreting "injury in fact," we made it clear that standing was not confined to those who could show "economic harm," ... Nor, we said, could the fact that many persons shared the same injury be sufficient reason to disqualify from seeking review of an agency's action any person who had in fact, suffered injury."
@688 "To deny standing to persons who are in fact, injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion."
Valley Forge Coll. v. Americans United
454 U.S. 464 (1982) @471, 472, 473, 474, 476
@471 "...although respondents lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the conveyance, they had standing merely as "citizens," claiming "injury in fact' to their shared individuated right to a government that `shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion,'" which standing was sufficient to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III."
@472 "Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 441 U. S. 99 (1979), and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 38, 426 U. S. 41 (1976)."
@473 "[W]hen a federal court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch...
@474 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), it has been recognized as a tool of last resort on the part of the federal judiciary throughout its nearly 200 years of existence...."
@476 Supra (footnote 13) "Article III obligates a federal court to act only when it is assured of the power to do so, that is, when it is called upon to resolve an actual case or controversy."
Whitmore v. Arkansas 495 U.S. 149 (1990) 154 - 155
@ 154 "It is well established, however, that before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue. Article III, of course,
Page 495 U. S. 155
gives the federal courts jurisdiction over only "cases and controversies," and the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 454 U. S. 471-476 (1982).
Our threshold inquiry into standing "in no way depends on the merits of the [petitioner's] contention that particular conduct is illegal," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 500 (1975)...
the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 461 U. S. 101-102 (1983).
Further, the litigant must satisfy the "causation" and "redressability" prongs of the Art. III minima by showing that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action," and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 38, 426 U. S. 41 (1976); Valley Forge, supra, 454 U.S. at 472.
The litigant must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy these Art. III standing requirements."
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
@560-561, 574-578
@560-561, 574-578
@560 "One of those landmarks, setting apart the "Cases" and "Controversies" that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III-"serv[ing] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process," Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)-is the doctrine of standing.
Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. See, e. g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized,
see id.,at 756; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972); 1
and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,'" Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95,102 (1983)).
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... thee] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
1 By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.
Page 504 U.S. 561
Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id., at 38, 43.
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth, supra, at 508."
@ 574 "In Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937), we dismissed a suit contending that Justice Black's appointment to this Court violated the Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
[[[[No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.]]]]
Page 504 U.S. 575
"It is an established principle," we said, "that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public." 302 U. S., at 634. See also Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429, 433434 (1952) (dismissing taxpayer action on the basis of Mellon)."
@576 "To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of the essential elements that identifies those "Cases" and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.
"The province of the court," as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803), "is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals." Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive. The question presented here is whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies' observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and
Page 504 U.S 577
that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of powers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3.
It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, "to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department," Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S., at 489, and to become" 'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.'" Allen, supra, at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15 (1972)).
We have always rejected that vision of our role:
"When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carryon governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted.
This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers .... This is very far from assuming that the courts are charged more than administrators or legislators with the protection of the rights of the people.
Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of administrative agents .... But under Article III, Congress established courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power." Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309-310 (1944) (footnote omitted).
Page 504 U.S. 578
"Individual rights," within the meaning of this passage, do not mean public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public. See also Sierra Club, 405 U. S., at 740-741, n.16.
Nothing in this contradicts the principle that "[t]he ... injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.'" Warth, 422 U. S., at 500 (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973)).
Both of the cases used by Linda R. S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law (namely, injury to an individual's personal interest in living in a racially integrated community, see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 208-212 (1972),
and injury to a company's interest in marketing its product free from competition, see Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 6 (1968)).
As we said in Sierra Club, "[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury." 405 U. S., at 738.
Whether or not the principle set forth in Warth can be extended beyond that distinction, it is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain."
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen.
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville
508 U.S. 656 (1993) @663-664
@663 "The doctrine of standing is "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992),
which itself "defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded," Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984).
It has been established by a long line of cases that a party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must demonstrate three things:
(1) "injury in fact," by which we mean an invasion of a legally protected interest that is
"(a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical," Lujan, supra, at 560 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted);
(2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant," and has not resulted "from the independent action of some third party not before the court," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); and
(3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of obtaining
Page 508 U.S. 664
relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too speculative," Allen v. Wright, supra, at 752.
These elements are the "irreducible minimum," Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982), required by the Constitution."
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona
520 U.S. 43 (1997) @64
@64 "Article III, § 2, of the Constitution confines federal courts to the decision of "Cases" or "Controversies." Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement.
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville,508 U. S. 656, 663-664 (1993) (standing to sue);
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 56 (1986) (standing to defend on appeal).
To qualify as a party with standing to litigate, a person must show, first and foremost, "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and" 'actual or imminent.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)).
An interest shared generally with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 573-576.
Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess "a direct stake in the outcome." Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The standing Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance. Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62."
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens
529 U.S. 765 (2000) @ 771 - 773
@ 771 "First, he must demonstrate "injury in fact"-a harm that is both "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Second, he must establish causation-a "fairly ... trace[able]" connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41 (1976).
And third, he must demonstrate redressability-a "substantial likelihood" that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. Id., at 45.
These requirements together constitute the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992)...."
@772 "An interest unrelated to injury in fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff standing. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 486 (1982); Sierra Club, supra, at 734-735."
@773 "See Steel Co., supra, at 107 ("[A] plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit"); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 69-71 (1986) (holding that assessment of attorney's fees against a party does not confer standing to pursue the action on appeal)."
[[[[ @773 - Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 (1998). ]]]]
What is the legal definition of
Treason?
The U.S. Constitution TREASON,
Article III.
Section. 3.
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
Article III.
Section. 3.
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
as does U.S. Code in upholding the Constitution of the United States, also state:
18 U.S. Code § 2381 - Treason
"Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States."
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