Armed UAV Operations 10 Years On
January 12, 2012 | 1417 GMT
One of the most iconic images of the American-led wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan -- as well as global U.S. counterterrorism efforts -- has been the
armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), specifically the MQ-1 "Predator" and the
MQ-9 "Reaper." Unarmed RQ-1 Predators (which first flew in 1994) were flying
over Afghanistan well before the 9/11 attacks. Less than a month after the
attacks, an armed variant already in development was deployed for the first
time.
In the decade since, the Predator has clocked more than a million flight
hours. And while U.S. Air Force procurement ceased in early 2011 -- with more
than 250 airframes purchased -- the follow-on MQ-9 Reaper has already been
procured in numbers and production continues. Predators and Reapers continue to
be employed in a broad spectrum of roles, including close air support (CAS),
when forward air controllers communicate with UAV operators to release ordnance
with friendly troops in the vicinity (CAS is one of the more challenging
missions even for manned aircraft because of the heightened risk of friendly
casualties). Officially designated "armed, multi-mission, medium-altitude, long
endurance, remotely piloted aircraft," the second to last distinction is the
Predator and Reaper's principal value: the ability to loiter for extended
periods, in some cases for more than 24 hours.
This ability affords unprecedented situational awareness and physical
presence over the battlefield. The implications of this are still being
understood, but it is clear that it allows, for example, the sustained and
constant monitoring of main supply routes for attempts to emplace improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) or the ability to establish a more sophisticated
understanding of high-value targets' living patterns. In addition, live,
full-motion video for ground controllers is available to lower and lower
echelons to an unprecedented degree.
As the procurement of Predators and Reapers and the training of operators
accelerated -- particularly under the tenure of former U.S. Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, beginning in 2006 -- the number of UAV "orbits" skyrocketed (an
orbit is a single, continuous presence requiring more than one UAV airframe per
orbit). There are now more than 50 such orbits in the U.S. Central Command area
of operations alone (counting several maintained by the larger, unarmed RQ-4
"Global Hawk"). The U.S. Air Force expects to be capable of maintaining 65
orbits globally by 2013, with the combined total of flight hours for Predator
and Reaper operations reaching about 2 million around the same time. In 2005,
UAVs made up about 5 percent of the military aircraft fleet. They have since
grown to 30 percent, though most are small, hand-launched and unarmed tactical
UAVs.
The Counterterrorism Value
One of the most notable uses of the Predator and Reaper has been in the
counterterrorism role, both as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) platform and as an on-call strike platform. These armed UAVs are operated
both by the U.S. Air Force and, in some cases (as with operations conducted over
Pakistan), the CIA. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the armed Predator then in
development was being considered as a means not only of keeping tabs on Osama
bin Laden but also of killing him. Since then, armed UAVs have proved their
worth both in the offensive strike role against specific targets and as a means
of maintaining a constant level of threat.
The value of the counterterrorism ISR that can be collected by large UAVs
alone is limited since so much depends on how and where they are deployed and
what they are looking for. This mission requires not only sophisticated signals
but also actionable human intelligence. But as a front-line element of a larger,
integrated collection strategy, the armed UAV has proved to be a viable and
enduring element of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy worldwide.
The ability to loiter is central and has a value far beyond the physical
capabilities of a single airframe in a specific orbit. Operating higher than
helicopters and with a lower signature than manned, jet-powered fighter
aircraft, the UAV is neither visibly or audibly obvious (though the degree of
inconspicuousness depends on, among other things, weather and altitude). Because
UAVs are so discreet, potential targets must work under the assumption that an
armed UAV is orbiting within striking distance at all times.
Such a constant threat can place considerable psychological pressure on the
prey, even when the predator is large and loud. During the two battles of
Fallujah, Iraq, in April and November of 2004, AC-130 gunships proved
particularly devastating for insurgents pinned in certain quadrants of the city,
but AC-130s were limited in number and availability. When it was not possible to
keep an AC-130 on station at night (in order to keep the insurgents' heads
down), unarmed C-130 transports were flown in the same orbits at altitudes where
the distinctive sound of a C-130 could be clearly discerned on the ground, thus
maintaining the perception of a possible AC-130 reprisal against any insurgent
offensive.
Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the psychological and operational impact
of this tactic on a group that experiences successful strikes on its members,
even if the strikes are conducted only rarely. Counterterrorism targets in areas
where UAVs are known to operate must work under tight communications discipline
and constraints, since having their cellular or satellite phone conversations
tapped risks not only penetration of communications but immediate and
potentially lethal attacks.
The UAV threat was hardly the only factor, but consider how Osama bin Laden's
communiques declined from comparatively regular and timely videos to rare
audiotapes. In 2001, bin Laden was operating with immense freedom of maneuver
and impunity despite the manhunt already under way for him. That situation
changed even as he fled to Pakistan, and the combination of aggressive signals
as well as UAV- and space-based ISR efforts further constrained his operational
bandwidth and relevance as he was forced to focus more and more on his own
personal survival.
The UAV threat affects not only the targeted individuals themselves but also
their entire organizations. When the failure to adhere to security protocols can
immediately yield lethal results, the natural response is to constrict
communications and cease contact with untrusted allies, affiliates and
subordinates. When the minutiae of security protocols start to matter, the
standard for having full faith, trust and confidence among those belonging to or
connected with a terrorist organization become much higher. And the more that
organization's survival is at stake, the more it must focus on survival, thereby
reducing its capacity to engage in ambitious operations. On a deeper level,
there is also the value of sowing distrust and paranoia within an organization.
This has the same ultimate effect of increasing internal distrust and thereby
undermining the spare capacity for the pursuit of larger, external
objectives.
The Evolving Geography
While armed Predators first operated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater, it
was the darkest days of the Iraq War, at the height of the violence there from
2005 to 2007, that saw the strongest demand for them. As the main effort shifted
from Iraq to Afghanistan, UAV operations began to shift with them. While UAVs
will remain in high demand in Afghanistan even as the drawdown of forces
continues there in 2012, the end of armed UAV operations in Iraq and the
continued expansion of the U.S. Air Force's Reaper fleet mean that considerable
bandwidth is being freed up for operations in other parts of the world. (In
Iraq, some UAVs may continue to be operated over northern Kurdish areas in
coordination with Turkey, and some private security contractors are operating a
small fleet of unarmed UAVs as part of protection efforts in coordination with
the U.S. State Department's Diplomatic Security Service.)
There are obvious diplomatic and operational limitations to the employment of
armed UAVs. Diplomatically, however, they also have demonstrated some value as
an intermediate step between purely clandestine operations run by the CIA and
the overt deployment of uniformed personnel and manned aircraft. Operationally,
while Predators and Reapers lack the sort of low-observability profile of the
RQ-170 (one of which was lost over Iran in 2011), UAVs lack pilots and pose no
risk of human personnel being taken captive. A UAV that crashes in Iran has far
fewer political ramifications than a piloted aircraft, making its deployment an
easier decision for political leaders.
Indeed, the last decade has seen the maturation of the armed UAV, including
its underlying architecture and doctrines. And while more than 50 Predators and
Reapers have been lost in Iraq and Afghanistan and in training over the past
decade, the aircraft are now essentially as safe and reliable as a manned
F-16C/D but far cheaper to procure, maintain and operate. And over the next 10
years, the Pentagon plans to grow its UAV fleet about 35 percent. The U.S. Air
Force plans to buy 288 more Reapers -- 48 per year from now through 2016 -- and
money for UAVs has remained largely untouched even as budget cuts intensify at
the Pentagon.
So while armed UAVs are merely one tool of a much broader and more
sophisticated counterterrorism strategy, they can be expected to be valuable for
the foreseeable future, and employed in areas of the world beyond Pakistan,
Somalia and Yemen (even along the U.S.-Mexico border in an unarmed role for
border patrol and counternarcotics missions). And despite an enormous breach in
U.S.-Pakistani relations following the deaths of two dozen Pakistani military
personnel in a cross-border incident in November and the consequent ejection of
the CIA from Shamsi airfield in Pakistan (from which it had operated armed UAVs
since October 2001), existing UAV orbits have been largely maintained. On Jan.
10, the first strike on Pakistani territory since November took place in North
Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas.
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[My comment: "Separately, to the Joint Chiefs, develop a ship launch and recapture model and use Diego Garcia for tactically eliminating ... hint, hint." -- Brianroy ]
Somali Piracy
http://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/600_width_full/public/main/images/Somali_piracy_expansion.jpg
Analysis
Since at least 2008, Somali pirates have been extending their area of
operations farther to the south and east from Somalia, extending in 2010 to near
Madagascar and the southwestern Indian coast. Though there was not much room to
grow in any case, 2011 saw the pirates' area of operations contract. The area in
which the pirates hijacked ships in 2011, while still considerable, shrunk to
about what it was in 2009 (with the exception of the North Arabian Sea, where
the pirates maintained the geographic range of operations they expanded to in
2010). Although the Somali pirates' area of operations has contracted, it has
only done so on the margins; the pirates are still very active within their core
area of the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Therefore, this decrease
along the periphery does not necessarily indicate a serious limitation of the
pirates' capabilities.
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