Terrorism and the Not-So-Exceptional Individual
May 24, 2012 | 0900 GMT
By Scott Stewart
In last week's Security Weekly, we used a thwarted underwear bomb plot,
as well as the U.S. government's easing the rules of engagement for
unmanned aerial vehicle strikes in Yemen, as an opportunity to examine the role of exceptional individuals in militant groups
that conduct terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's
(AQAP's) innovative bombmaker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, is one such individual.
Reported by AP on May 7, the news of the thwarted underwear plot
overshadowed another event in Yemen that occurred May 6: a U.S.
airstrike in Shabwa province that killed Fahd al-Quso, a Yemeni militant
wanted for his involvement in the attack against the USS Cole in
October 2000. Al-Quso appeared in a video released by AQAP's al-Malahim Media
in May 2010, during which he threatened attacks against the continental
United States, its embassy in Yemen and warships in the waters
surrounding Yemen.
The media and the U.S. government frequently mention al-Quso's
involvement in the USS Cole bombing, but they rarely discuss his precise
duty the day of the attack. Al-Quso had been tasked to record the
attack from ashore so that the video could be used later in al Qaeda
propaganda. Unfortunately for the group, al-Quso was derelict in his
duty; he slept through his alarm, and the attack went unrecorded.
Oversleeping a terrorist attack was not al-Quso's only operational
gaffe. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al-Quso had been
dispatched in January 2001 to transport money to al Qaeda facilitator
Walid bin Attash in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The money reportedly funded
the travel and initial living expenses of 9/11 operatives Nawaf al-Hazmi
and Khaled al-Midhar. However, al-Quso failed to get a Malaysian visa.
He was stuck in Bangkok, and bin Attash, al-Hazmi and al-Midhar had to
meet him in Bangkok to retrieve the funds.
If al-Asiri gives cause to discuss the role of the exceptional
individual in terrorism operations, al-Quso provides us the opportunity
to discuss the not-so exceptional individual -- and how these maladroit
actors nonetheless pose a threat.
Tradecraft Errors
The history of al Qaeda's war against the United States is replete
with examples of jihadist operations that were foiled due to tradecraft
failures. In September 1992, Ahmed Ajaj attempted to enter the United States
with a poorly altered Swedish passport while carrying a suitcase full
of bombmaking instructions and other training manuals and videos. Both
lapses in judgment are characteristic of a novice. An alert customs
inspector stopped Ajaj, who later was detained and charged with passport
fraud.
Ajaj was traveling from Osama bin Laden's Khaldan training camp in
Afghanistan with Abdel Basit, also known as Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind
of the 1993 World Trade Center attack. An immigration
inspector likewise stopped Basit, but he requested political asylum.
Because he was not carrying a suitcase full of bombmaking manuals or
using an altered passport, Basit later was released pending a hearing on
his asylum claim. (Had he remained in custody, the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing would not have been conducted.)
In another instance of tradecraft error, the would-be millennium bomber, Ahmed Ressam, fell
victim to "burn syndrome" while attempting to enter the United States
from Canada in December 1999. Ressam panicked when approached by a U.S.
customs inspector, who was performing a routine check of the ferry on
which he was traveling. The inspector was unaware that Ressam was an
Islamist militant or that he was in operational mode. In fact, when
Ressam lost his composure, she assumed he was smuggling drugs rather
than explosives.
The 9/11 Commission Report also detailed a number of errors committed
by the supposed al Qaeda elite prior to hijacking the four aircraft on
9/11. Mohammed Atta was cited for driving with an invalid license and
failed to appear at the subsequent court hearing, causing a bench
warrant to be issued for his arrest. Moreover, known al Qaeda associates
al-Hamzi and al-Midhar entered the United States under their own names.
(A flight instructor even characterized al-Hamzi and al-Midhar as "Dumb
and Dumber," saying they were "clueless" as would-be pilots.) Any of
these errors could have brought down the entire 9/11 operation.
More recently, we have seen cases where individuals such as Faisal
Shahzad and Najibullah Zazi have shown the intent, but not the ability,
to conduct attacks. While Shahzad was able to assemble a large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device without detection,
the design of the device's firing chain was seriously flawed -- clearly
the work of a novice. U.S. government surveillance of Zazi's activities
determined that he was an inexperienced bombmaker
and that he could not create the proper chemical mixture to manufacture
effective triacetone triperoxide (TATP). This is common problem for
novice bombmakers. We have seen several planned attacks, such as the London bomb attempt on July 21, 2005, fizzle out due to bad batches of TATP.
In another example, U.S. Army Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo was arrested and charged with planning an attack on Ft. Hood
in July 2011. Abdo was brought to the attention of the authorities
after purchasing smokeless powder to be used in an improvised explosive
device. His furtive demeanor caused a store clerk to report him to the
police.
As Stratfor has noted, there has been a shift in the jihadist threat.
Once stemming from the al Qaeda core, the jihadist threat now emanates
primarily from grassroots jihadists. While grassroots jihadists pose a
more diffuse threat because they are more difficult than hierarchical
groups for national intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect,
they also pose a less severe threat because they generally lack the
terrorist tradecraft required to conduct a large-scale attack. Since
they lack such tradecraft, they tend to seek assistance to conduct their
plots. This assistance usually involves the acquisition of explosives
or firearms, as seen in the February 2010 case involving Amine el Khalifi.
In this case, an FBI informant posing as a jihadist leader provided the
suspect with an inert suicide vest and a submachine gun before the
suspect's arrest for plotting to attack the U.S. Capitol building.
The dynamic of would-be attackers reaching out for help has been seen repeatedly in the United States. In June 2011, two jihadists were arrested in Seattle
and charged with plotting to attack a U.S. Military Entrance Processing
Station in an industrial area south of downtown Seattle. The men
attempted to obtain M16 rifles and hand grenades from an FBI informant.
Notably, this trend also has been seen outside the jihadist world. On
April 30, five self-identified anarchists were arrested
in connection with a plot to destroy a bridge outside Cleveland, Ohio.
They had purchased remotely detonated improvised explosive devices from
an FBI informant.
The Cleveland group had previously discussed constructing improvised
explosive mixtures using recipes they had found on the Internet. But the
possibility of buying authentic C4 explosives was attractive to them
because, according to the FBI criminal complaint filed in the case, the
group believed the real explosives would be more powerful and
destructive than homemade explosives.
Would-be attackers, such as Shahzad and the anarchists of the
Cleveland group, typically do not have a realistic assessment of their
capabilities and therefore tend to attempt attacks that are beyond their
capabilities. In attempting a spectacular attack, they frequently
achieve little or nothing. As we have previously noted, it is a rare individual
who possesses the requisite combination of will, discipline,
adaptability and technical skill to make the leap from theory to
practice and become a successful militant in a lone-wolf or small-cell
environment.
The Danger of 'Kramer Jihadists'
Through retrospective trial testimony or FBI arrest affidavits, the
exploits of Abdo, el Khalifi or the Cleveland anarchists can appear
almost comical. In fact, such cases often leave people wondering if
ridiculous would-be attackers could be involved in terrorist activity to
begin with. However, militant groups -- indeed, most organizations --
are composed of exceptional individuals and not-so-exceptional
individuals. Just as the business world needs chief executive officers,
engineers and assembly line workers, the militant world needs
operational planners, bombmakers, foot soldiers and suicide bombers.
Placed in the proper roles, these individuals can combine their efforts
to produce effective results.
It is easy to dismiss novice militants as inept, but we should keep
in mind that if some of these individuals found an actual terrorist
facilitator rather than a federal informant, they probably would have
killed many people in an attack. Richard Reid, often referred to as the "Kramer of al Qaeda" after the bumbling character from the television series Seinfeld,
came very close to taking down a jumbo jet full of people over the
Atlantic Ocean because he had been equipped and dispatched by those more
capable than himself. Working under the leadership of exceptional
individuals, even al-Hamzi and al-Midhar ("Dumb and Dumber") helped
hijack American Airlines Flight 77, which was crashed into the Pentagon
on 9/11.
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing provides a valuable lesson on
dealing with Kramer jihadists. Before the attack, a government informant
infiltrated the core group of perpetrators. After the informant proved
to be too difficult to handle, coverage of the group was dropped because
its members were considered inept. In truth, many of them were; one
suspect, Mohammed Salameh, tried to retrieve the deposit he put down on
the rental truck used to transport the bomb. But this only highlights
the importance of the exceptional individual -- in this case, Abdel
Basit. He was sent to New York to lead what proved to be a successfully
executed bomb plot.
History demonstrates clearly that even groups of bumbling aspiring
attackers can be organized successfully if they are empowered by someone
who provides them with means and oversight. Accordingly, authorities
cannot afford to ignore bumblers, no matter how inept they may appear.
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