It has come to light that
the United States Survivors of the Ben Ghazi terrorists, in spite of Obama's
inaction and hope that they would be wiped out, have returned to a United
States where they are ordered into silence.
Some have been so seriously wounded, that more than 6 months later, they
are still hospitalized and recuperating, their identities altered to conceal
them. According to Graham, they have the
first hand ability and testimony that Obama’s Ambassador to Libya, Chris
Stevens, was indeed gun-running to terrorists in Syria by way of Turkey for
Obama, and under Obama’s direct orders.
It was for that reason, they related to Senator Graham, that Ambassador
Stevens was killed. In essence, what the
ex-CIA officers have uncovered and placed for we the American People to know,
is not only just highly accurate, but has been affirmed, and awaits a form of
legal testimony under oath.
The act of aiding and
abetting Al Qaida or Al Qaida affiliate terrorists in Syria, by Obama, by a legal and direct link, allows the
charges of impeachment to be laid by the United States Senate against Obama for
committing Treason. These witnesses who were the U.S. victims at the Ben Ghazi , Libya Mission and/or Central Intelligence Agency Annex, need
to give sworn and signed testimony, video taped and affirmed, before Obama’s
zealots inside or outside the Federal Agencies assassinate these people. Only by coming forth the more quickly, can
they avoid assassination by Obama’s Totalitarian zealots, and exercise the
power given them under the Constitution.
They have sworn to uphold the Constitution against all enemies,
including those domestic; so that when Obama commits treason, they are NOT
breaking their oaths of secrecy regarding such a specific event, and can retain
counsel in regard to such when they feel that they personally are uncertain whether
this or that insight needs to be rephrased to not reveal certain operational or
technological advantages that can be tersely glossed upon while yet remaining
ambiguous and informative while 100% true to the narratives they have to tell.
Meanwhile, earlier this
month, on March 6, 2013, Debkafile (Israeli
Intelligence News) reported how that the new Obama Defense Secretary,
Chuckie Hagel, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, laid into Israel’s Defense Secretary
Ehud Barak and Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren because “Hizballah
has been able to procure a quantity of chemical weapons from Syria”, and the Israelis did not stop them from doing so.
Excuse
me? And if the Israelis killed any one
of the 8 to 12 U.S. Advisers (alleged to be) on the ground with the terrorists, helping them
against Assad, what would Obama do? He
would consider it an act of war and a pretext to use the U.S. Military might to
attempt to destroy the State of Israel for Islam. When Muslims kill U.S. Citizens and
Intelligence Agents, Obama doesn’t care.
It is up to the Intelligence Agencies to order and or coordinate a
counter-attack (with like minded Chiefs of Staff at the Department of Defense),
or to tell Obama to “stand down while we do this” or “don’t dare get the f*ck in our way” as they
did with Osama Bin Laden and in retribution to multiple C.I.A. officers getting
blown up in one fell swoop in Afghanistan.
In fact, we have a Defense Department that by its own actions, appears
to at least intellectually assent that Obama really is NOT a United States
Natural Born Citizen, so that when he strays too much from what Agenda of rules
of retaliation against terrorists they find acceptable, they simply carry that tit-for-tat
mission out.
As of today, March 19, 2013, we are beginning to see
reports where chemical weapons are being used, probably moreso by the Obama
terrorists firstly in the Khan al-Assad rural outskirts of Aleppo than by Assad’s
forces.
And in nervousness, the Russians, last Thursday (March 14) rather than
docking at their naval base of Tartus of Syria, pulled 3 warships with 700 Russian Marine Infantry troops into Beirut,
as the Obama aided and comforted (and undeniably partially militarily small-armed
by Obama's covert direction) terrorist invasion and civil war combine spirals into greater chaos.
[[[[[Update PM of March 19, 2013
Video of Syrian Accusation of U.S. Internally Funding and Supporting External Al Qaida Terrorists, and that it is an Invasion, NOT a Civil War but an Importation of Terrorists Acting In Cooperation with Obama's Administration
http://youtu.be/PKQBHdp0h1c
End of PM of March 19, 2013 Update ]]]]]
[[[[[Update PM of March 19, 2013
Video of Syrian Accusation of U.S. Internally Funding and Supporting External Al Qaida Terrorists, and that it is an Invasion, NOT a Civil War but an Importation of Terrorists Acting In Cooperation with Obama's Administration
http://youtu.be/PKQBHdp0h1c
End of PM of March 19, 2013 Update ]]]]]
With this knowledge and background information, I now introduce the Stratfor article:
A New Reality in U.S.-Israeli Relations
March 19, 2013 | 0900 GMT
By George Friedman
A
New Reality in U.S.-Israeli Relations is republished with permission
of Stratfor.
U.S. President Barack Obama is
making his first visit to Israel. The visit comes in the wake of his re-election and
inauguration to a second term and the formation of a new Israeli government
under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Normally, summits between Israel
and the United States are filled with foreign policy issues on both sides, and
there will be many discussed at this meeting, including Iran, Syria and Egypt.
But this summit takes place in an interesting climate, because both the
Americans and Israelis are less interested in foreign and security matters than
they are in their respective domestic issues.
In the United States, the political
crisis over the federal budget and the struggle to grow the economy and reduce
unemployment has dominated the president's and the country's attention. The Israeli elections turned on domestic
issues, ranging from whether the ultra-Orthodox would be required to serve in
Israel Defense Forces, as other citizens are, to a growing controversy over
economic inequality in Israel.
Inwardness is a cyclic norm in most
countries. Foreign policy does not always dominate the agenda and periodically
it becomes less important. What is interesting is at this point, while Israelis
continue to express concern about foreign policy, they are most passionate
on divisive internal social issues. Similarly, although there continues to
be a war in Afghanistan the American public
is heavily focused on economic issues. Under these circumstances the
interesting question is not what Obama and Netanyahu will talk about but
whether what they discuss will matter much.
Washington's
New Strategy
For the United States, the focus on
domestic affairs is compounded by an emerging strategic shift in how the United
States deals with the world. After more than a decade of being focused on the
Islamic world and moving aggressively to try to control threats in the region
militarily, the United States is moving toward a different stance. The bar for
military intervention has been raised. Therefore, the United States has, in
spite of recent statements, not militarily committed itself
to the Syrian crisis, and when
the French intervened in Mali the United
States played a supporting role. The intervention in Libya, where
France and the United Kingdom drew the United States into the action, was the
first manifestation of Washington's strategic re-evaluation. The desire to
reduce military engagement in the region was not the result of Libya. That
desire was there from the U.S. experience in Iraq and was the
realization that the disposal of an unsavory regime does not necessarily -- or
even very often -- result in a better regime. Even the relative success of
the intervention in Libya drove home the point that every intervention has both
unintended consequences and unanticipated costs.
The United States' new stance ought
to frighten the Israelis. In
Israel's grand strategy, the United States
is the ultimate guarantor of its national security and underwrites a portion of
its national defense. If the United States becomes less inclined to
involve itself in regional adventures, the question is whether the guarantees
implicit in the relationship still stand. The issue is not whether the United
States would intervene to protect Israel's existence; save from a nuclear-armed
Iran, there is no existential threat to Israel's national interest. Rather, the
question is whether the United States is prepared to continue shaping the
dynamics of the region in areas where Israel lacks political influence and is
not able to exert military control. Israel wants a division of labor in the
region, where it influences its immediate neighbors while the United States
manages more distant issues. To put it differently, the Israelis' understanding
of the American role is to control events that endanger Israel and American
interests under the assumption that Israeli and American interests are
identical. The idea that they are always identical has never been as true as
politicians on both sides have claimed, but more important, the difficulties of
controlling the environment have increased dramatically for both sides.
Israel's
Difficulties
The problem for Israel at this point
is that it is not able to do very much in the area that is its
responsibility. For example, after the relationship with the United States,
the second-most important strategic foundation for Israel is its relationship -- and peace treaty -- with Egypt
Following
the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the fear was that Egypt might
abrogate the peace treaty, reopening at some distant point the possibility of
conventional war. But the most shocking thing to Israel was how little control
it actually had over events in Egypt and the future of its ties to
Egypt. With good relations between Israel and the Egyptian military and
with the military still powerful, the treaty has thus
far survived. But the power of the military will not be the sole
factor in the long-term sustainability of the treaty. Whether it survives
or not ultimately is not a matter that Israel has much control over.
The Israelis have always assumed
that the United States can control areas where they lack control. And some
Israelis have condemned the United States for not doing more to manage events
in Egypt. But the fact is that the United States also has few tools to control
the evolution of Egypt, apart from some aid to Egypt and its own relationship
with the Egyptian military. The first Israeli response is that the United
States should do something about problems confronting Israel. It may or may not
be in the American interest to do something in any particular case, but the
problem in this case is that although a hostile Egypt is not in the Americans'
interest, there is actually little the United States can do to control events
in Egypt.
The Syrian situation is even more
complex, with Israel not even certain what outcome is more desirable. Syrian
President Bashar al Assad is a known quantity to Israel. He is by no means
a friend, but his actions and his father's have always been in the pursuit of
their own interest and therefore have been predictable. The
opposition is an amorphous entity whose ability to govern is questionable and that
is shot through with Islamists who are at least organized and know what they
want. It is not clear that Israel wants al Assad to fall or to
survive, and in any case Israel is limited in what it could do even if it
had a preference. Both outcomes frighten the Israelis. Indeed, the hints
of
American weapons shipments to the rebels at
some point concern Israel as much as no weapons shipments.
The Iranian situation is equally
complex. It is clear that the Israelis, despite rhetoric to the contrary, will
not act unilaterally against Iran's nuclear weapons. The risks of failure are
too high, and the consequences of Iranian retaliation against fundamental
American interests, such as the flow of oil through the Strait of
Hormuz, are too substantial. The American view is that an Iranian nuclear
weapon is not imminent and Iran's ultimate ability to build a deliverable
weapon is questionable. Therefore, regardless of what Israel wants, and given
the American doctrine of military involvement as a last resort when it
significantly affects U.S. interests, the Israelis will not be able to move the
United States to play its traditional role of assuming military burdens to
shape the region.
The
Changing Relationship
There has therefore been a very real
if somewhat subtle shift in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Israel has lost the
ability, if it ever had it, to shape the behavior of countries on its
frontier. Egypt and Syria will do what they will do. At the same time, the
United States has lost the inclination to intervene militarily in the broader
regional conflict and has limited political tools. Countries like Saudi Arabia,
which might be inclined to align with U.S. strategy, find themselves in a
position of creating their own strategy and assuming the risks.
For the United States, there
are now more important issues than the Middle East, such as the
domestic economy. The United States is looking inward both because it has to
and because it has not done well in trying to shape the Islamic world. From the
Israeli point of view, for the moment, its national security is not at risk,
and its ability to control its security environment is limited, while its
ability to shape American responses in the region has deteriorated due to the
shifting American focus. It will continue to get aid that it no longer needs
and will continue to have military relations with the United States,
particularly in developing military technology. But for reasons having little
to do with Israel, Washington's attention is not focused on the region or at
least not as obsessively as it had been since 2001.
Therefore Israel has turned inward
by default. Frightened by events on its border, it realizes that it has little
control there and lacks clarity on what it wants. In the broader region,
Israel's ability to rely on American control has declined. Like Israel, the
United States has realized the limits and costs of such a strategy, and Israel
will not talk the United States out of it, as the case of Iran shows. In
addition, there is no immediate threat to Israel that it must respond to. It
is, by default, in a position of watching and waiting without being clear as to
what it wants to see. Therefore it should be no surprise that Israel, like the
United States, is focused on domestic affairs.
It also puts Israel in a reactive
position. The question of the Palestinians is always
there. Israel's policy, like most of its strategic policy, is to watch and
wait. It has no inclination to find a political solution because it cannot
predict what the consequences of either a solution or an attempt to find one
would be. Its policy is to cede the initiative to the Palestinians. Last month,
there was speculation that increased demonstrations in the West Bank could
spark a third intifada. There was not one. There might be another surge of
rockets from Gaza, or there might not be. That is a decision that Hamas will
make.
Israel has turned politically inward
because its strategic environment has become not so much threatening as beyond
its control. Enemies cannot overwhelm it, nor can it control what its enemies
and potential enemies might do. Israel has lost the initiative and, more
important, it now knows it has lost the initiative. It has looked to the United
States to take the initiative, but on a much broader scale Washington faces the
same reality as Israel with less at stake and therefore less urgency.
Certainly, the Israelis would like to see the United States take more
aggressive stands and more risks, but they fully understand that the price and
dangers of aggressive stands in the region have grown out of control.
Therefore it is interesting to
wonder what Obama and Netanyahu will discuss. Surely Iran will come up and
Obama will say there is no present danger and no need to take risks. Netanyahu
will try to find some way to convince him that the United States should
undertake the burden at a time suitable to Israel. The United States will
decline the invitation.
This is not a strain in the
U.S.-Israeli relationship in the sense of anger and resentment, although those
exist on both sides. Rather it is like a marriage that continues out of habit
but whose foundation has withered. The foundation was the Israeli ability to
control events in its region and the guarantee that where the Israelis fail,
U.S. interests dictate that Washington will take action. Neither one has the
ability, the appetite or the political basis to maintain that relationship on
those terms. Obama has economics to worry about. Netanyahu has the conscription
of the ultra-Orthodox on his mind. National security remains an issue for
both, but their ability to manage it has declined dramatically.
In private I expect a sullen
courtesy and in public an enthusiastic friendship, much as an old, bored
married couple, not near a divorce, but far from where they were when they were
young. Neither party is what it once was; each suspects that it is the other's
fault. In the end, each has its own fate, linked by history to each other but
no longer united.
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