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In the Year of our LORD Jesus Christ
-- As of January 20, 2017
A Sigh Of Relief With The Inauguration Of Donald John Trump as President of the United States of America, And Hope For A Prosperous Future For All United States Citizens (we who are a nation called "the melting pot of the world"). We shall be great and exceptionally great again.

It is likely that the entries to this blog will be less frequent than in years past. I do intend to keep this blog active, and to offer insightful information and/or opinion (and sometimes humor and/or entertainment on occasion) when I do post.

Peace and Liberty. Semper Fidelis.

Wednesday, October 28, 2015

October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis President's Intelligence Notes We Legally Can See. Declassified And Sanitized CIA Intelligence Briefing Notes Released For Public Consumption As of July 2015.

The Cuban Missile Crisis  occurred during the days of Tuesday October 16 to Sunday  October 28, 1962.

Considering how that jackass Communists, Muslim sympathizers and Muslims. and Obama groupie sh*t for brainers on psychotropic drugs who strut around demanding hypersensitivity to their deviance and congenital idiocy relabeled as political correctness, and how they are pushing toward a nuclear confrontation with the Manchurian Compact of Russia and China at the Ukraine, at Syria, at the South China Sea, it is a necessary thing to know what the talking points of rationale would be and how they will spin this among themselves by looking at the past.  If you do not understand the past, those who try to conquer you will use that ignorance to their advantage and encroach and infringe and conquer under the old maxim which says "Knowledge is power."

  The following is direct sanitized and declassified material for public consumption, and the *** and **** signs designate that words or whole sections of comments were deleted and sanitized as still classified, even after 53 years.












The ff. map was used in the October 19  briefing

OCTOBER  19, 1962

“1.  Cuba    

   a.     Another surface-to-air missile site has been located.
           This one, situated close to the border between Matanzas and Las
            Villas provinces, brings the total of identified SAM sites to 22.

  b.    *** at least nine of these installations are probably now operational.

  c.     There are ***  IL-28 crates at San Julian in the extreme west of Cuba. 
          The aircraft are being unpacked and one is well along in assembly.

 d.    At Santa Clara in central Cuba there are now ***  MIG-21s.   ****”

October 20, 1962


OCTOBER 22, 1962


 d.    Cuban air force activity was stepping up rapidly late last week.
        We noted   ***  pilots operating MIGs in ***
         at San Antonio de los Banos and Santa Clara. 

 f.   Alpha-66 announced it has put to sea again to harass shipping,
                          particularly British, to Cuba. “ 

[[[[Transcript of President Kennedy's October 22, 1962 Speech  at:   http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1962kennedy-cuba.html   ]]]]

October 23, 1962

“1.    Cuba          
 (A roundup of world-wide reaction to the President’s statement is enclosed separately.)

I.                     The reaction within Cuba
                          a.        Fidel Castro is scheduled to go on the air later today, at a time still unannounced. 

                          b.       Cuban ground, air and naval units have moved into the alert status
                           decreed yesterday even before the President’s broadcast.  
                   d.       The most recent analysis of photography (from a mission flown
                           20 October)  does not alter our count on missile sites,  but does raise
                           the total of identified missiles and launchers.   We can now account for
                          33 missiles and 23 launchers.”

October 24, 1962

“1.  Cuban problem      

I.  The Local situation

a.       Fidel Castro had little new to say last night.  As expected,  he rejected any proposal for international inspection of Cuban  territory. 

c.   The latest photographic intelligence does not change our figures on
      missile sites, missiles, and launchers.  It pushes the estimated
      readiness date at two MRBM sites back from 22 to 25 October.
     Photography also shows erection of camouflage nets under way  at some sites.  



II.          Soviet Reaction
        a.        There has been no major reaction since yesterday’s statement published by
                      TASS        (We do not have any report from Kohler on his meeting with
                      Khrushchev).     The expected Soviet propaganda orchestration is beginning to 
                      build up.

             b.       There have been a number of *** statements by Soviet officials that Soviet 
                    ships will not submit to blockade.


    III.                     Other reactions
a.        There have been no surprises cropping up in the past 24 hours.
b.      In New York, neutral members of the UN are trying to generate
steam  behind a move to get U Thant to do something about heading
off a US-USSR showdown.   

October 25, 1962

“1.  Situation in Cuba

a.        Photography ***revealed no new missile sites, and no additional missiles,
missile transportation or erectors.


 g.  The standdown of Cuban tactical aircraft continues in effect and all naval ***
Reports out of Havana, however, are that things are relatively quiet and there
is none of the confusion that accompanied the mobilization in April 1961.
Cuban domestic reporting of the President’s speech omits all reference to offensive
missile bases in Cuba “which was the direct reason for the action taken.” 
Cuban media take the line set by Castro in his speech, denying there are any

offensive weapons in Cuba and never using the word missile.

2.  Shipping 

3.  Bloc Relations    

     a.  We have noted no significant movement or deployment in any of the Bloc military forces.  

     c.  The naval auxiliary Terek, now under surveillance by a US ship, appears to be backing
         and filling northwest of the Azores.  It may intend to make another submarine rendezvous.  

d.       Soviet and other bloc media are making much of Khrushchev’s statement favoring
a top-level meeting but have not elaborated on the remark.  There has been no mention
of the diversion of Soviet shipping. 

e.       Gromyko’s remarks on the German situation – the first direct commentary on the
problem by a high  Soviet official since the President’s address on Cuba – were
purposely vague and contained no hint of retaliatory measures which might be taken
against us in Berlin.   

4.  Non-bloc reaction    
      a .  Official and unofficial expression of support and understanding for the US position on
           Cuba have reached an impressive volume from such diverse quarters as Switzerland,
           India and Sudan.

     b.   Demonstrations against US establishments overseas have so far not been of
           unmanageable size or force.
      c.  So far there has been no reaction to the President’s reply to U Thant.
           Neutral representatives at the UN will be concerting again this morning following
           consultations last night with their governments."   

October 26, 1962


The navy this morning forced a Soviet submarine to the surface at a point about 350 miles south of
Bermuda.  It has also stopped and boarded the Lebanese freighter, Marcula,  inside the quarantine zone. 

1.        The Cuban Problem

a.        Havana remains quiet, but the prevailing atmosphere is one of slowly rising tension.


d.      We are beginning to see evidence that the Cubans are having their headaches over
mobilization and logistic problems.  They are also getting worried about the
possibility of civil disturbances.  


f.       Photographs taken yesterday indicate there has been no slackening in the pace
of construction work at the missile sites.  They also show what looks like missile
check-out operations in progress at two San Cristobal MRBM sites.  

      2.        Non-bloc reaction     
         Reactions in the non-Communist world are about what they were yesterday. 
         However, there seems to be something of a ground swell of uneasiness developing,
         notably in Europe,  over the possibility that the Soviets will take retaliatory action. 

3.       Bloc support


     c.   Guinea and Senegal have assured us that they will deny landing rights to Soviet
           aircraft bound for Cuba.  Morocco seems to be coming around as well.  So far
           so good, but it remains to be seen how well these countries stand up to Soviet
           pressures.  ****

      4.        Bloc reaction
a.        Scattered indications that some Soviet and satellite ground and air units are on
alert status keep coming in, but we observe no important abnormalities in the bloc’s
military posture.

b.      Moscow is making much of Khruschchev’s acceptance of U Thant’s proposal for
US-USSR negotiations.  Peiping, however, is grumbling that Moscow again has
shown itself to be weak-kneed.     ***"

October 27, 1962

     "1.        Cuba  

a.       A preliminary look at yesterday’s photography shows no change in the pace of
Construction.  Our estimate of operational readiness dates stands unchanged. 

            c.   Photography has also turned up a launcher for the “Frog” missile.
                  This is a short-range (50,000 yards)  tactical unguided rocket similar to our
                  Honest John.  It can carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead. 


            e.   Raul Castro’s assumption of personal command in eastern Cuba has
                   been followed by rapid mobilization and deployment of reserve units
                   throughout Oriente province. 

f.       Cuban spokesmen and media remain adamant in refusing any inspection

by outsiders.  ***

       2.        Bloc Shipping  
       3.       Bloc Reaction
a.        No significant development of ground, air, or naval forces has been noted;
Apparently normal exercise activity is continuing in many of the major commands.




      d.    The Soviet propaganda line continues to be that the USSR is taking a calm and
              reasonable approach to the problem while the US is in a state of “war hysteria.”  
             The Soviet diplomatic drive for negotiations also continues.

e.         Khruschchev *** earlier this week *** was “very pleased” with the progress
  of the Rusk-Gromyko talks, and made no threat of retaliation in Berlin for

  US action in Cuba.

     4.       Non-bloc Attitudes
a.        There has been no distinct shift in the pattern of reaction elsewhere.
b.      Further support for us has come from several quarters in Western Europe, and
unfavorable commentary is decidedly in the minority.  A poll shows two thirds of
British  public opinion to be with us. 



e.   Many quarters, after some premature optimism, are now having trouble
      deciding whether there has been an easing of the crisis or not.

f..      La Paz, Bolivia, was the scene of street fighting near the US embassy involving some
3,000 anti-American labor union members.  The press also reports that Buenos Aires
and Caracas have been hit by demonstrations.

g.       The Venezuelan Defense Ministry has requested riot-control equipment and
ammunition for all services against the contingency of an all-out Communist effort.
Embassy Caracas considers this request to be of the utmost urgency. "

October 28, 1962

       " 1.        Cuba  
a.        On the basis of aerial photographs obtained from missions flown on Friday and
Saturday, we estimate that all 24 MRBM missile launchers are now fully operational. 



d.     Camouflage against aerial photography is becoming more effective. 
         Automatic anti-aircraft weapons have also been deployed around many of the

         missile sites in the past few days.  


3.  Bloc Reactions
      a.  There has been no significant change in the bloc’s military posture since yesterday.  ***
     b.   Bloc propaganda this morning began changing gears from praising Khrushchev’s 
             proposals for a settlement to sharp attacks on our turning them down. 
             As expected, there has been no change in Peiping’s line that the only right policy 
             is one of no compromise.

      c.        In Eastern Europe, scattered instances of scare buying, hoarding, and
                   blackmarketeering are symptomatic of an underlying apprehensiveness
                   over the way things are going.          

e..        During the past month, Moscow has increased its daily radio broadcasts to
Cuba from one hour to ten.

f.       As of Thursday. The Voice of America Russian broadcasts  were getting by
Soviet jamming in the Moscow area with a quality ranging from good to

loud and clear.  

        4.       Non-Bloc Reactions
a.        Returns are still coming from Khrushchev’s proposals, but so far we have seen
no surprises.   Neutral sentiment for some sort of a quid pro quo settlement
is strong.

b.       Venezuela yesterday got out in front in Latin America by ordering a full-scale
Mobilization of its armed forces.  This action followed closely on the heels of
President Betancourt’s declaring that the time had come to get rid of the Cuban
Threat “once and for all.”

c.        Bolivia has followed Brazil’s lead in coming out in opposition to the application
 of stiffer measures against Cuba. "

OCTOBER 29. 1962
        "1.        USSR
a.        We see Khrushchev’s Cuban misadventure as a major setback for him personally.

b.      The decision to put the missiles in Cuba, as well as the decision to pull them out,
was almost certainly his alone.  We did not, however, see any signs of high-level
opposition to the missile deployment, as we have in the case of some of
Khrushchev’s other pet schemes.

c.       There are no scapegoats for this one and he will be blamed by just about everyone. 
Many whom he has bullied are probably secretly pleased.

d.       The top leadership put in a mass appearance at a theater performance

last night, we suspect, to show their ranks are undivided.   

        2.        Cuba
a.        Castro faces a serious setback to his prestige.

b.      Obviously not consulted beforehand on Khrushchev’s exchanges with the
President, he is trying hard to get Moscow to back his demands for major
concessions from us before pulling the missiles out.
So far the only endorsement he has gotten has come from Peiping. 
c.        Special editions of two of Havana’s leading newspapers were issued yesterday
 making much of Castro’s conditions, and they have been given heavy play on the
 Cuban radio.

        3.        Cuba – USSR   
a.       We do not believe the Soviets will attempt to delay implementation of their
promise to dismantle the missile sites.

b.       Nor do we believe Khrushchev’s expressed “wish” that we discontinue
 reconnaissance to be intended to provide a pretext for procrastination.

c.        We think the USSR would go along if we were to insist that initial steps
be taken immediately (next day or two) to get inspection in Cuban organized
and underway.

d.       Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov arrived in New York last night
saying the USSR intends to resolve outstanding international problems
through negotiation.

e.        Neither he, nor Khrushchev, nor Soviet media have mentioned Berlin in
connection with the most recent moves on the Cuba problem, suggesting that
Moscow will continue to play the German problem in low key for the time being.

f.        In initial response Bloc media are claiming that Khrushchev’s latest “blow for freedom”
proves the USSR’s peaceful intentions.  The attempt is to salvage some prestige from
the shambles by showing that the move averted unilateral US action. 

        4.        East Germany – Berlin
a.        The opinion is gaining ground among officials at the medium level in the East
German party and government that our strong stand on Cuba will cause 
Moscow to postpone action on Berlin and a peace treaty.

b.       Western businessmen who visited East Berlin late last week at the height of the
crisis say they found a “business as usual” atmosphere and heard no mention of a

 blockade of West Berlin in retaliation for the Cuban quarantine.  

        5.       Communist China – USSR
a.        Communist China’s leaders have recently stepped up their criticism of
Soviet foreign policy and appear determined to undermine confidence in
Soviet leadership.  We have not gotten a reaction yet to Moscow’s latest moves in the
Cuban crisis, but it will be bitter.



d.       Peiping’s latest note charges the Soviets with betrayal for allowing international
communism to fall behind in the nuclear arms race by not sharing technical
information with China since 1959.
e.       China also accuses Moscow of betraying the international communist movement
 on another front – the India border dispute. 
Peiping says it is absurd to think of Moscow playing a pacifying role in this issue:
“Communists must draw a clear-cut line between themselves and their adversaries.”
f.        The Chinese, it seems, choose to ignore Moscow’s recent shift from neutrality
 to a position of cautious support for them on this issue.  *** ” 

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