Article III Standing...What did the Supreme Court Say About It? 8 Cases And Their Quotations You May Well Come Across.

Article III Standing...What did the Supreme Court Say About It?

    
    I have found it necessary to share at length Court Citations in dealing with the issue of Article III standing.  

 When you read these, place this precondition as you read the text, of someone who runs as a Natural Born Citizen for President of the United States against those who are not.  

      Do not let anyone now existing enter the mind in considering the application of law.  Do those who are competitor candidates of the same party with equal or greater votes, who are deprived of necessary delegates to be a party winner in a State or at a Convention, do the legal natural born citizen candidates have legal standing to sue when someone illegally running against them takes away votes and delegates and deprives them of their legal right to only run against legal and qualified to run competitor candidates?  

I am posting these as a means of both education and reference in regard to POTUS Candidates suffering injury in fact by having their Constitution of the United States right to run only against those who also are United States Natural Born Citizens violated, that if or when such a lawsuit comes, that there is reference that might be referred to perhaps to copy or hyperlink when discussing it in forums, or in referencing the Article III standing issue.  

 I have inserted my  couple of aids below in green.  

 Baker v. Carr  369 U.S. 186 (1962)

 @204     "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing. It is, of course, a question of federal law."

 @208       " A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution when such impairment resulted from dilution by a false tally, cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299; or by a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily selected precincts, cf. United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, or by a stuffing of the ballot box, cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385."

 "  "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."    Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 163. "

 United States v. SCRAP  412 U.S. 669 (1973)

@686                 "In interpreting "injury in fact," we made it clear that standing was not confined to those who could show "economic harm," ... Nor, we said, could the fact that many persons shared the same injury be sufficient reason to disqualify from seeking review of an agency's action any person who had in fact, suffered injury."

 @688                  "To deny standing to persons who are in fact, injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion."

  

Valley Forge Coll. v. Americans United 

 454 U.S. 464 (1982)

@471        "...although respondents lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the conveyance, they had standing merely as "citizens," claiming "injury in fact' to their shared individuated right to a government that `shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion,'" which standing was sufficient to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III."

 @472          "Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 441 U. S. 99 (1979), and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 38, 426 U. S. 41 (1976)."

 @473    "[W]hen a federal court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch...

@474     Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), it has been recognized as a tool of last resort on the part of the federal judiciary throughout its nearly 200 years of existence...."

 @476 Supra (footnote 13)      "Article III obligates a federal court to act only when it is assured of the power to do so, that is, when it is called upon to resolve an actual case or controversy."

Whitmore v. Arkansas  495 U.S. 149 (1990)

 @ 154        "It is well established, however, that before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue. Article III, of course,

 Page 495 U. S. 155

 gives the federal courts jurisdiction over only "cases and controversies," and the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 454 U. S. 471-476 (1982).

 Our threshold inquiry into standing "in no way depends on the merits of the [petitioner's] contention that particular conduct is illegal," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 500 (1975)...

 the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 461 U. S. 101-102 (1983).

 Further, the litigant must satisfy the "causation" and "redressability" prongs of the Art. III minima by showing that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action," and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 38, 426 U. S. 41 (1976); Valley Forge, supra, 454 U.S. at 472.

 The litigant must clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy these Art. III standing requirements."

  

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife  504 U.S. 555 (1992)

@560    "One of those landmarks, setting apart the "Cases" and "Controversies" that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III-"serv[ing] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process," Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)-is the doctrine of standing.

Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. See, e. g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).

Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -an invasion of a legally protected interest which is

(a) concrete and particularized, 

see id.,at 756; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972); 1

and

(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,'" Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95,102 (1983)).

  Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... thee] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare

 1   By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. 

Page 504 U.S. 561 

Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976). 

Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id., at 38, 43. 

The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth, supra, at 508." 

@ 574       "In Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937), we dismissed a suit contending that Justice Black's appointment to this Court violated the Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, § 6, cl. 2.

 [[[[No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.]]]]

 Page 504 U.S. 575

 "It is an established principle," we said, "that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public." 302 U. S., at 634. See also Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429, 433434 (1952) (dismissing taxpayer action on the basis of Mellon)."

@576     "To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of the essential elements that identifies those "Cases" and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.

 "The province of the court," as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803), "is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals." Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive. The question presented here is whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies' observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and

 Page 504 U.S  577

 that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of powers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious:

 To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3.

  It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, "to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department," Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S., at 489, and to become" 'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.'"   Allen, supra, at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15 (1972)). 

  

We have always rejected that vision of our role:

"When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carryon governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted. 

 This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers .... This is very far from assuming that the courts are charged more than administrators or legislators with the protection of the rights of the people. 

 Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of administrative agents .... But under Article III, Congress established courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power."    Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309-310 (1944) (footnote omitted).

 Page 504 U.S.  578

 "Individual rights," within the meaning of this passage, do not mean public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public. See also Sierra Club, 405 U. S., at 740-741, n.16.

 Nothing in this contradicts the principle that "[t]he ... injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.'" Warth, 422 U. S., at 500 (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973)).

  Both of the cases used by Linda R. S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law (namely, injury to an individual's personal interest in living in a racially integrated community,  see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 208-212 (1972), 

 and injury to a company's interest in marketing its product free from competition, see Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 6 (1968)).

  As we said in Sierra Club, "[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury." 405 U. S., at 738. 

 Whether or not the principle set forth in Warth can be extended beyond that distinction, it is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain."

  

Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. 

Contractors of America v. Jacksonville  

 508 U.S. 656 (1993)

@663                "The doctrine of standing is "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992),

 which itself "defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded," Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984).

  It has been established by a long line of cases that a party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must demonstrate three things: 

(1) "injury in fact," by which we mean an invasion of a legally protected interest that is

 "(a) concrete and particularized, and

(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical," Lujan, supra, at 560 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted);

 (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant," and has not resulted "from the independent action of some third party not before the court," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); and

  (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of obtaining  

 Page 508 U.S. 664  

  relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too speculative," Allen v. Wright, supra, at 752.

 These elements are the "irreducible minimum," Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982), required by the Constitution."   

  

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona  

520 U.S. 43 (1997)

 @64     "Article III, § 2, of the Constitution confines federal courts to the decision of "Cases" or "Controversies." Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement.

 Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville,508 U. S. 656, 663-664 (1993) (standing to sue); 

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 56 (1986) (standing to defend on appeal).

  To qualify as a party with standing to litigate, a person must show, first and foremost, "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and" 'actual or imminent.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)).

An interest shared generally with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 573-576.

Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess "a direct stake in the outcome." Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

 The standing Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance. Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62."

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. 

United States ex rel. Stevens 

529 U.S. 765 (2000)

  @ 771       "First, he must demonstrate "injury in fact"-a harm that is both "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 Second, he must establish causation-a "fairly ... trace[able]" connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41 (1976).

 And third, he must demonstrate redressability-a "substantial likelihood" that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. Id., at 45.

 These requirements together constitute the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992)...."

 @772             "An interest unrelated to injury in fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff standing. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 486 (1982); Sierra Club, supra, at 734-735."

  @773            "See Steel Co., supra, at 107 ("[A] plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit"); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 69-71 (1986) (holding that assessment of attorney's fees against a party does not confer standing to pursue the action on appeal)."

[[[[ @773 - Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 (1998). ]]]]